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BROWN SHOE: IN STEP WITH ANTITRUST
WALTER ADAMS* and JOEL B. DIRLAM**
I.
Half a century ago, John Bates Clark articulated the meaning of
free competition, and suggested some guidelines for its preservation.
In our worship of the survival of the fit under free natural selec-
tion we are sometimes in danger of forgetting that the conditions
of the struggle fix the kind of fitness that shall come out of it; that
survival in the prize ring means fitness for pugilism, not for
bricklaying nor philanthropy; that survival in predatory com-
petition is likely to mean something else than fitness for good and
efficient production; and that only from a strife with the right
kind of rules can the right kind of fitness emerge. Competition
is a game played under rules fixed by the state to the end that, so
far as possible, the prize of victory shall be earned, not by trick-
ery or mere self-seeking adroitness, but by value rendered. It is
not the mere play of unrestrained self-interest; it is a method of
harnessing the wild beast of self-interest to serve the common
good-a thing of ideals and not of sordidness. It is not a natural
state, but like any other form of liberty, it is a social achievement,
and eternal vigilance is the price of it.1
To preserve this "form of liberty"-to reify this "social achieve-
ment"-was the central purpose of the antitrust laws. Starting in
1890, and consistently thereafter, Congress expressed the view that
competition is the life of trade, that business operates best when left
alone, and that government's natural role is "that of a patrolman
policing the highways of commerce. It is the duty of the modern
patrolman to keep the road open for all and everyone and to prevent
highway robbery, speeding, the running of red lights and other viola-
tions that will endanger and hence, in the end, slow down the overall
movement of traffic." By this Congress meant that "occupations were
to be kept open to all who wished to try their luck, that the individual
was to be protected in his 'common right' to choose his calling and
that hindrances to equal opportunity were to be eliminated."2 Accord-
ing to the sponsors of the Sherman Act, business transactions were to
be regulated so as "to preserve a system in which gain is sought and
obtained by efficiency in bargaining with customers, and to discourage
* Professor of Economics, Michigan State University.
** Professor to Economics, Michigan State University.
1. CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS 200-01 (1914).
2. THORELLI, THE FEDEm l ANTITRUST PoICY 226 (1955). See also Hamilton
& Till, Antitrust in Action, TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 16 (1941) and Stelzer, Th
Social Objectives of Antitrust Policy, 6 ANTITRUST BuLi. 595 (1961).
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the quest or achievement of market advantage by methods that are
unfair or collusive." s The New Freedom, said President Wilson, was
intended to assure the individual of "fair play" in the market place,
because "without the watchful interference, the resolute interference,
of the government, there can be no fair play between individuals and
such powerful institutions as the trusts."4 If big business was to
triumph, it should be forced to do so only through "intelligence and
economy."" The objective of antitrust, therefore, was to devise ground
rules--canons of fair play-which would at once "preserve the com-
petitive process and . . .channel it along socially productive lines." 6
The implementation of these ground rules was to consist of both
general and specific limitations on the "freedom of contract." The
general limitations included prohibitions against all contracts, combi-
nations and conspiracies in restraint of trade ;7 against all acts of
monopolizing ;8 and against all unfair methods of competition. 9 The
specific limitations proscribed price discrimination,0 tying arrange-
ments, exclusive dealing, 1 corporate mergers and acquisitions, 12 and
interlocking directorshipsl'--but only where their effect "may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." The
thrust of these limitations, enacted over a period of sixty years, was to
outlaw those forms of business behavior which were inimical to a
competitive market structure and, by presumption, to business per-
formance in the public interest. The underlying assumption was that
a competitive system, operating through competitive markets, pro-
vides the most effective means of promoting economic progress, eco-
nomic justice and economic welfare-that, conversely, any interfer-
ence with such a system would automatically cause public injury and
therefore be inconsistent with the public interest.
II.
The anti-merger policy of the Clayton Act rests on a specific pre-
sumption against growth by combination, and in favor of growth by
internal expansion. This presumption, in turn, is based on four major
postulates. According to the first postulate, firms should grow by
3. DnLAM & KAHN, FAIR COMPEITION 16 (1954).
4. WiLsoN, THE NEW FREEDOM 284 (1913).
5. DIRLAM & KAHN, op. cit. supm note 3, at 15.
6. Id. at 16.
7. Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 1, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
8. Sherman Anti-Trust Act § 2, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
9. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 74 Stat. 200 (1960), 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1958).
10. Clayton Act § 2, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
11. Clayton Act § 3, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
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competition-creating rather than competition-lessening methods-by
"building" rather than "buying." Internal growth, manifesting itself
in new plants, or new products, can scarcely avoid intensifying com-
petition, whereas combination, which eliminates an independent unit
from the market, tends, on balance, to lessen rather than create com-
petition. Bethlehem's entry into the Chicago steel market is a case
in point. Originally, the company had intended to effectuate entry by
merging with Youngstown, in order to be in a better competitive
position vis-A-vis the area's dominant producer, U.S. Steel. Once the
merger was blocked,14 however, Bethlehem decided to proceed with its
plans by constructing a new steel mill.15 Who can doubt that this type
of expansion, independent of any other steel company, will provide
steel buyers with more alternatives and make for greater rivalry
among steel sellers in the Chicago area-that it will create more com-
petition than if Bethlehem had combined with Youngstown into a
single decision-making unit and thus destroyed a potential competitor
in an industry that is already overconcentrated?
A second postulate supporting the anti-merger presumption holds
that internal growth stems from success in the market, whereas com-
bination implies the artificial elimination of a going concern. Funds
for internal growth can be derived either from retained earnings or
the sale of securities, reflecting consumer acceptance of the firm's
products, in the one case, and investor approval of the firm's financial
performance, in the other. In either event, there is a presumption that
the firm's growth has been justified by objective market standards-
in contrast to the merger process which implies an artificial short-
circuit of an exogenous market judgment. This does not gainsay the
possibility that a monopoly, too, may grow by internal means alone,
nor that such growth may in extremis yield undesirable social conse-
quences. It means only that growth by merger, if permissible without
restraint, would facilitate and hasten the structural transformations
in industry which the antitrust laws are designed to prevent.
The third postulate states that economies of scale, wherever they
are indeed significant, can be realized through internal growth as well
as through acquisition and merger. To forbid "size" achieved through
merger does not condemn a firm, an industry, or society to a loss of
economic efficiency. A firm which must be big in order to be efficient
may achieve the necessary size through internal growth-without
destroying a competitor. 6 It may be argued, of course, that a strict
12. Clayton Act § 7, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
13. Clayton Act § 8, 49 Stat. 717 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
14. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
15. Bethlehem Steel Corp., Release, "Burns Harbor Plant," Dec. 3, 1962.
16. Among the economies of scale that may be internally achieved are those of
Washington University Open Scholarship
IN STEP WITH ANTITRUST
anti-merger statute is incompatible with the creation of optimum-size
firms, because some markets are simply not big enough to accommo-
date two firms, each operating at maximum efficiency. Whether this
reservation is relevant in many industries-or, indeed, any industries
-has not yet been demonstrated, except in such public utilities as
electric light and power, telephones and gas distribution. In these
"natural monopoly" industries, the market is clearly too narrow for
duplicate firms of optimum size, but then again these industries are
not in the free enterprise segment of the economy, nor are they ex-
pected to operate in accordance with the structural model presupposed
by the antitrust laws. Their performance in the public interest is not
compelled by competition, but controlled by public regulation or public
ownership.
The fourth postulate states that collective action in restraint of
trade-whether among competitors or between suppliers and cus-
tomers-is incompatible with a competitive free enterprise system.
Thus, any agreement to fix prices, regardless of the amount of com-
merce involved or the power of the conspirators to make the agree-
ment "stick," is a per se violation of the law.17 Given this uncondi-
tional prohibition of price control by agreement, how can the law
permit price control by merger? If it is contrary to public policy for
two competitors to fix prices while retaining their nominal indepen-
dence, how can they be permitted to attain the same objective more
neatly, easily and permanently by combining into a single decision-
making unit? Obviously, if contracts, agreements and conspiracies in
restraint of trade strike at the "central nervous system" of a com-
petitive economy, mergers and combinations have the same effect.
Both represent a "denial to commerce of the supposed protection of
competition."'1, Both are inimical to a system which operates through
the compulsions that exogenous, untrammeled market forces bring to
management. Too often, it is assumed that merger is the only hope for firms
saddled with obsolescent and ineffectual administrators. Yet, these firms seldom
make an effort to infuse their organization with better talent by the simple expe-
client of paying higher salaries, or terminating contracts of unsatisfactory man-
agers.
17. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
And the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved is not material ...
since § 1 of the [Sherman] Act brands as illegal the character of the restraint
not the amount of commerce affected .... Whatever economic justification
particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not
permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of
their actual or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra at 224-26 n.59.
18. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir.
1945).
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bear on numerous and independent centers of initiative-a system
which cannot tolerate collective action in any form that seeks to
immunize firms from the pressures of the market place.
III.
Given this presumption of our anti-merger policy, the postulates on
which it rests and the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act,
it is difficult to understand some recent criticisms of section 7 case
law. The Federal Trade Commission, says Professor Bork, has shown
a face that "is not an attractive one."'19 The Commission, claims
Professor Kalmowski, has handed down decisions that have "sinister
implications for the health of our economy. '20 The Brown Shoe case,
writes Professor Adelman, is infused with "protectionist" thinking:
"Translated into intelligible speech, it all means that the merging
firms will gain economies which will make life harder for their com-
petitors, and this must be forbidden." 21 According to Professor
Handler, the Brown decision reflects a trend toward "per se illegality"
in merger proceedings, 22 and, according to Business Week, it casts
"doubt on the legality of just about any merger. 23
Unfortunately, the critics do not outline the impending catastrophe
in concrete detail. They produce no evidence of the economic loss
resulting from unwise administration and naive interpretation of a
law they never directly attack. Instead, they seem to assume-im-
plicitly-that the mergers which have been challenged would certainly
yield economies of scale, the cost savings of vertical integration, the
risk-spreading of conglomerate acquisitions, or a combination of these
advantages. If a given merger did not yield such benefits, the critics
seem to be saying, why would its promoters have pushed it? The
present enforcement mistakes, they claim, could be quickly corrected,
if only the Commission and the courts would, on a case-by-case basis,
19. Bork, Anticompetitive Doctrines Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 39
TEXAS L. REV. 832 (1962).
20. Kalmowski, Section 7 and Competitive Effects, 48 VA. L. REV. 827, 850
(1962).
21. Adelman, The Antimerger Act, 1950-60, 51 Am. ECON. REV. Proceed. 236,
240-41 (1961).
22. Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, 61 COLUm. L. REV. 629, 641 (1961).
23. More Confusion About Mergers, Business Week, June 30, 1962, p. 160. For
other unafavorable appraisals of enforcement policy under section 7, see Peterson,
The Case Against Antimerger Policy, Business Horizons, Winter 1961, p. 111 and
Lewyn & Mason, Ten Years under the New Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A
Lawyer's Practical Approach to the Case Law, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1067 (1961).
For a more favorable, and possibly more balanced, appraisal, see Dirlam, The
Celler-Kefauver Act (forthcoming as part of a compendium on administered prices
by the Subcommittee on Antitrust & Monopoly, United States Senate, 1963).
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pursue a full economic investigation, taking into account "all matters
evidencing the acquisition's likely impact on the vigor of competi-
tion.' ' 24 Decisional calamities could be avoided by a comprehensive and
supposedly definitive economic comparison of the "vigor" of competi-
tion before the merger with its probable "vigor" after the merger.
Presumably, the wisdom of Pillsbury25 should be substituted for the
policy thrust of Celler-Kefauver.
Without suggesting that section 7 policy in the past has always
been elegantly articulated or felicitously applied, we must reject these
criticisms. The Pillsbury doctrine, requiring "a case-by-case exami-
nation of all relevant factors" in order to ascertain probable economic
consequences, is administratively not feasible. The standards it sug-
gests are not tied to measurable variables, and tend to invite intermi-
nable and equivocal excursions into the unquantifiable. The proposed
examination of "all relevant factors" would almost inevitably swamp
the proceedings and stultify enforcement. 26 Efforts to evaluate "quali-
tative" changes in the "vigor" of competition, and emphasis on the
amount of competition which remains in the market rather than the
competition which has been eliminated by a merger, augur-in spite
of disclaimers-a substitution of Sherman Act for Clayton Act stand-
ards in judging combinations. In the extreme, the Pillsbury doctrine
means that, even if a merger creates or strengthens an oligopoly, it is
not necessarily unlawful; its presumed illegality can be rebutted by
pointing to the "vigor" of competition among the oligopolists remain-
ing in the market.27 Paraphrasing the French observer's comment on
the charge of the Light Brigade, "c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas
la guerre," we say "the Pillsbury approach may be a wonderful dis-
traction for economists, but it does not constitute enforcement of the
anti-merger law."
If we are to eschew full-scale economic investigations, and the
Pillsbury version of the ancient rule of reason, what are the alter-
natives? What economic standards can be used as aids to decision-
making under section 7? The central standards, we submit, must
focus on defendants' size, rank and market share, because it is these
24. Handler & Robinson, supra note 22, at 664.
25. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
26. For a discussion of this point with reference to Clayton Act proceedings
under section 3, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), especially at 314.
27. "There is nothing in the record to indicate that the mergers will at present
convert the industry in the southeast from a competitive to a non-competitive pat-
tern. The inference, in fact, must be to the contrary inasmuch as large national
distributors, such as General Mills and Quaker Oats, and large regional distrib-
utors remain to furnish effective oompetition to Pillsbury Mills." Pillsbury
Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 572 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
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indicia that best show the probable effect of a merger on the per-
sistence of competition.28 The crucial test must be "structural," and
it must be applied in the institutional context of a particular industry.
Obviously, the loss of one competitor means little in the knit outer-
wear industry, but a great deal in steel. A vertical merger by a leading
firm in a relatively unconcentrated industry (like shoes) may seem to
foreclose only a small market; yet, if duplicated by others, it may
seriously limit outlets for smaller manufacturers. Diversification by
large firms may have no immediate effect on concentration ratios, but
conglomerate mergers may nevertheless increase the power of such
firms to exert leverage against their more specialized rivals. In short,
the paramount consideration in a merger decision must be the struc-
tural transformation that is likely to flow from the combination, but
this transformation must be evaluated in the context of the industry
in question.
Since 1950 there have been several proposals suggesting specific
structural standards for interpreting section 7. According to Kaysen
and Turner, for example, "Adverse effects on competition shall be
presumed whenever a company that for five years or more has ac-
counted for twenty percent or more of annual sales in a market
acquires any competitor in that market, unless such competitor is
insolvent or in obviously declining circumstances."29 Acquisitions
resulting in less than 20 per cent market control would, under this
rule, be forbidden only in case of "severe" limitations on entry, active
"influence on prices by the acquired company," or "other factr.'30
Similar, but more stringent, structural tests have been proposed by
Professor Stigler.1 Recognizing that, absent collusion, competition
will be effective if the largest firm in an industry "has less than 10%
of the output,"3 2 Stigler suggests that (a) mergers resulting in a com-
bined market percentage of 20 per cent or more be prohibited; (b)
mergers resulting in a market share of less than 5 to 10 per cent be
allowed-the percentage to be lower, the larger the industry; and
(c) mergers between these limits be dependent for their legality on
ease of entry, rate of growth, closeness of substitutes, the competitive
28. For an insightful discussion of structural standards in antitrust enforce-
ment, see Lanzillotti, Market Structure and Antitrust Vulnerability, Nat'l Indus.
Conference Bd. Proceedings (1963).
29. KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 99 (1959). If it could be shown
that the acquisition would yield "substantial" economies of scale or resource util-
ization which could not be effected in any other way than through merger, the
prima facie case could be rebutted. Id. at 133.
30. Id. at 133-36.
31. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176
(1955).
32. Id. at 181.
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organization of the industries making substitutes and the familiar
"other factors."' 3 Vertical mergers, under the Stigler rule, would be
prohibited if a firm producing 20 per cent or more of an industry's
output were to acquire more than 5 or 10 per cent of an industry to
which it sells or from which it buys.3'
A third set of structural standards for section 7 has been proposed
by Professor Bok.35 Disillusioned with the usefulness of more sophis-
ticated economic measures, and in the interest of providing simple
rules that would relieve uncertainty and reduce delay in merger cases,
Bok argues that (a) a dominant firm should not be allowed to merge
if its market share had increased by two or three percentage points
over a specified base period ;36 (b) large firms other than the industry
leader should not be permitted to merge, where the aggregate share
of the eight largest in the industry had increased by more than eight
or nine percentage points over a specified base period ;37 and (c)
(vertical) mergers should be proscribed where the acquired firm con-
trols more than 5 per cent of the market.3 8
These structural tests, though rigid and arbitrary, point in the right
direction. While the "escape" clause proposed by Kaysen and Turner
is debatable; while the necessary data for Bok's base period may be
non-existent; and while Stigler's twilight zone may be a bit nebulous,
all three proposals focus on the crucial questions in any merger deci-
sion, viz. size, rank and market shares. Nevertheless, these structural
tests must be made more flexible. The fixed percentages must be
regarded as no more than targets, to be moved up or down in accor-
dance with the economic realities of the industry to which they are
applied. In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Warren: "Congress indi-
cated plainly that a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the con-
text of its particular industry .... ,,39
Statistics reflecting the share of the market controlled by the
industry leaders and the parties to the merger are, of course, the
primary index of market power; but only a further examination
of the particular market-its structure, history and probable
future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the prob-
able anticompetitive effects of the merger.40
33. Id. at 182.
34. Id. at 183.
35. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics,
74 HARv. L. REv. 226 (1960).
36. Id. at 308.
37. Id. at 315-16.
38. Id. at 328-32.
39. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
40. Id. at 332 n.38.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
It was in the'much maligned and widely misinterpreted doctrine of
"quantitative substantiality," first announced by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter in the Standard Stations case,4' that the proper balance between
structural tests and industry environment was neatly summarized.
Interpreted against the backdrop of Congressional intent and the eco-
nomic postulates underlying anti-merger legislation, "quantitative sub-
stantiality" steers a middle course between the rigid percentage for-
mulas of Kaysen and Turner, Stigler and Bok, on the one hand, and the
cornucopia of escape hatches provided by the Pillsbu" approach, on
the other. "Quantitative substantiality" represents a preponderant
reliance on structural considerations in arriving at merger decisions;
it represents a refusal to be trapped into fanciful and unproductive ex-
cursions into "all relevant factors"; yet it also embodies the recogni-
tion that structural standards must be calibrated to fit particular in-
dustries and particular market. Thus, a merger involving 1 per cent
of the market may mean little in an industry which is already over-
concentrated and where structural relief may be obtained only by
Sherman Act measures, but it may mean a great deal in a relatively
unconcentrated industry where a substantial lessening of competition
or a trend toward monopoly may yet be stopped in their incipiency.
The same I per cent, in other words, may have a different significance
in different industries, and may call for different policy postures. As
Einstein put it, in explaining relativity, "When you sit with a nice
girl for two hours, you think it's only a minute. But when you sit
on a hot stove for a minute, you think it's two hours."
IV.
In the light of these standards, does the Brown Shoe decision make
economic sense? Is it in the grain of antitrust policy? Is it likely to
promote effective competition or become a cloak for anticompetitive
protectionism?
At the time of the trial, Brown operated 30 shoe factories. It was
the fourth largest shoe manufacturer in the United States, accounting
for about 4 per cent of domestic shoe production, and ranked 223d on
Fortune's list of the 500 largest industrials. Its control over manu-
facturing facilities had been established, in part, at least, by the acqui-
sition between 1951 and 1956 of seven companies engaged solely in
shoe manufacturing. Its purchase of Kinney raised Brown's manu-
facturing percentage to 4.5 per cent, and made it the third largest shoe
producer in the country. Brown was part of a relatively unconcen-
trated industry in which the four largest producers-International,
Endicott-Johnson, Brown (including Kinney) and General Shoe-
41. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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accounted for approximately 23 per cent of the output, and the largest
24 manufacturers for about 35 per cent.4 2
In addition to its manufacturing plants, Brown also controlled a
total of 1,230 retail outlets, some owned or leased, and some operating
under its franchise plans. 845 of these outlets were obtained between
1951 and 1956-many by buying, not building. Among these were
Wohl Shoe Company, the nation's largest operator of leased shoe de-
partments, which controlled 250 outlets in department stores through-
out the country, and the Regal Shoe Corporation which not only had
110 retail stores, but also owned a manufacturing plant making men's
shoes. These vertical acquisitions, it should be noted, reflected a
general trend in the shoe industry.43
Kinney, though it was the twelfth largest shoe manufacturer (ac-
counting for 0.5 per cent of national production), was primarily an
operator of "family" retail shoe stores. Its 360 stores sold about 1.2
per cent of the nation's shoes (by value) and 1.6 per cent (by volume),
or slightly more than Brown's two major retail chains. 4 4 In a number
of communities, the combined Kinney-Brown share of the retail shoe
business ranged from 5.1 to 57.7 per cent in women's shoes, 5 to 51.8
per cent in children's shoes, and 5.1 to 24.8 per cent in men's shoes.4 5
Kinney's strength (and profitability) was due largely to store location
-reflecting the company's imaginative response to the suburbaniza-
tion trend and its innovation of "free standing" stores in shopping
centers. At the time of the merger, Kinney bought no shoes from
Brown.
Brown wanted to acquire Kinney because Brown's
traditional customers, independent retailers, located in downtown
areas, were not taking leases in the new suburban centers.
[Brown] did not have the personnel to create from its own ranks
a retail organization in the popular price field capable of moving
into the new.., centers .... [I] t was.., more practical to buy
an organization that was a successful retailer .... [A] s Kinney
moved into new suburban locations, Kinney would find it desir-
able to ... [add] some higher grade lines and that would give
Brown "an opportunity... to sell them in that category." 4
In 1955, the president of Brown stated that "one of our principal
objectives in acquiring retail stores is to protect and guarantee dis-
tribution of our products in areas where independent retailers could
42. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 300 (1962).
43. Id. at 302.
44. Id. at 303.
45. Appendices A, B and C, id. at 347-53.
46. Brief for Appellant, pp. 100-01, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
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not give our brands adequate distribution because of their affiliations
with other branded manufacturers. '47
Brown bought Kinney, therefore, in order to enjoy a captive market
for shoes, and to avoid the expense of building from scratch its own
retail outlets in the shopping centers and suburban areas. Its decision
to buy rather than build undoubtedly reduced Brown's marketing
risks, but it also entailed economic consequences for the shoe industry
which the enforcement agencies could not, given anti-merger law and
policy, afford to ignore. The merger tended not only to inhibit poten-
tial competition at the retail level, but, more important, to foreclose
a segment of the market (Kinney) from free and equal access by
other manufacturers. Since both the purpose and the effect of the
merger was exclusion, the only remaining question under the law was
whether the exclusion was so trifling that it could be dismissed as
de rinimis-i.e. lacking in "quantitative substantiality."
The courts, of course, answered both the foreclosure and substan-
tiality questions in the affirmative. In doing so, they rejected defen-
dants' reliance on rigid percentage tests, and the contention that
Kinney's share of the retail market was admittedly microscopic and
Brown's share of shoe manufacturing only slightly larger. Despite the
observations of some critical commentators, we submit the courts were
right-for a number of reasons. First, the courts were correct in
defining the "relevant market." For estimating the competitive effect
of this merger, the relevant market did not comprise all retail shoe
establishments, but only those to whom Brown shoes appealed-just
as the relevant market for gauging the importance of duPont's control
over General Motors did not include all fabrics and finishes, but only
those firms (mostly G.M.) for whose custom duPont considered it
worthwhile to compete. 8 Brown did not try to buy Sears Roebuck;
it bought Kinney. It was not concerned about selling shoes to mail-
order houses, but to independent retailers located in suburban areas.
And Kinney, as the largest family shoe chain-remembering that
family shoe stores account for an increasing proportion of all retail
shoes sales-was an important element in this market. If, in order to
secure an outlet, Brown considered it desirable to buy up $48,000,000
worth of this market, can the resulting foreclosure be dismissed as
lacking "substantial" antitrust consequences?
Second, and perhaps more important, the Kinney acquisition was
only one step in Brown's vigorous pursuit of vertical integration. With
no retail outlets of its own prior to 1951, Brown "had acquired 845
47. Quoted in Brief for the United States, p. 110, Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, supra note 46. (Emphasis supplied.)
48. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours, 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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such outlets by 1956."49 Judge Weber's simile, therefore, though ridi-
culed by some, is extraordinarily d propos: "We can only eat an apple
a bite at a time. The end result of consumption is the same whether
it be done by quarters, halves, three-quarters, or the whole, and is
finally determined by our own appetites. A nibbler can soon consume
the whole with a bite here and a bite there. So, whether we nibble
delicately, or gobble ravenously, the end result is, or can be, the
same." 50 And, it is the clear intent of the Celler-Kefauver Act to deal
with gradual accretions of power, achieved through a series of small
acquisitions, in their incipiency-i.e. long before they have become
full-blown Sherman Act violations.51
Third, Brown's acquisition of Kinney was part of a "definite trend"
toward vertical integration by large shoe manufacturers. Thus, the
Court found that
International Shoe Company had no retail outlets in 1945, but
by 1956 had acquired 130; General Shoe Company had only 80
retail outlets in 1945 but had 526 by 1956; Shoe Corporation of
America, in the same period, increased its retail holdings from
301 to 842; Melville Shoe Company from 536 to 947; and Endi-
cott-Johnson from 488 to 540 .... Moreover, between 1950 and
1956 nine independent shoe store chains, operating 1,114 retail
shoe stores, were found to have become subsidiaries of these large
firms and to have ceased their independent operations.52
Between 1945 and 1956, the six largest shoe manufacturers had more
than doubled their ownership of retail outlets-much of it by acqui-
sition-so that by 1956 they owned 3,830 retail stores, or more than
10 per cent of the total.5 3 The unmistakable trend was partly slowed
down when General Shoe signed a self-limiting consent decree.54 Had
49. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 301 (1962).
50. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
51. Under the Sherman Act, an acquisition is unlawful if it creates a monop-
oly or constitutes an attempt to monopolize. Imminent monopoly may appear
when one large concern acquires another, but it is unlikely to be perceived
in a small acquisition by a large enterprise. As a large concern grows through
a series of such small acquisitions, its accretions of power are individually so
minute as to make it difficult to use the Sherman Act tests against them....
Where several large enterprises are extending their power by successive small
acquisitions, the cumulative effect of their purchases may be to convert an
industry from one of intense competition among many enterprises to one in
which three or four concerns produce the entire supply. S. REP. No. 1775,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8.
(Quoted by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 329 n.48 (1962).
52. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 51, at 301.
53. Brief for the United States, p. 18, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra
note 51.
54. United States v. General Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 68,271 (M.D. Tenn.
1956).
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the Government lost the Brown case, however, the number of mergers
following the decision would, according to a trade journal, "make your
eyes pop."'55 Moreover, if the Government had not attempted to stop
Brown's drive for vertical foreclosure, could it have stopped other
large manufacturers from corralling retail outlets by buying existing
retail chains? That is, could the Government have prevented the sub-
stantial foreclosure, though gradual, of the retail market, and the
consequent denial of free and equal access to independent manufac-
turers ? It is doubtful. Hence the Court correctly diagnosed the struc-
tural transformations, and their probable effects, which would flow
from approval of the Brown-Kinney merger.
Fourth, the "definite trend" toward vertical integration in the in-
dustry was accompanied by a concomitant trend "for the parent-
manufacturers to supply an ever increasing percentage of the retail
outlets' needs, thereby foreclosing other manufacturers from effec-
tively competing for the retail accounts. Manufacturer-dominated
stores were. . . 'drying up' the available outlets for independent pro-
ducers." 56 While the latter might be expected to turn "elsewhere"-
to the outlets possibly vacated by Brown (or other integrating manu-
facturers) -there is no reason to assume that, simply because a firm
acquires a captive market, it will withdraw from a corresponding
share of the competitive market. Moreover, as Brown pointed out in
its brief, shoe manufacturing, in spite of the free access to leased
machines, is not a highly flexible business: "shoe factories tend to
specialize in the manufacture of a particular type and grade of
shoes.""-7 For this reason, small manufacturers had repeatedly lost
markets to their integrated rivals. "Eight experienced executives...
described their experiences in losing business when one of the large
manufacturers purchased or otherwise selected control of retail outlets
with which they had previously done business."' 8 "[Alt least five of
Kinney's suppliers ... each relied upon Kinney to purchase more than
40% of its total production .... " 9 Given the shoe industry's trend
toward vertical integration by acquisition, therefore, small manufac-
turers increasingly found themselves in the position of sprinters who
lost the competitive race because they were denied access to the start-
ing blocks.
55. Footwear News, June 28, 1962, p. 1.
56. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 301 (1962).
57. Brief for Appellant, p. 127, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 56.
58. Brief for the United States, p. 112, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra
note 56.
59. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 370 (1962) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). See also the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Clark at 355-57.
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V.
In view of all these considerations, was the Court correct in con-
cluding that the effect of the Brown-Kinney merger "may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition"? We think so. Although Brown's share
of shoe manufacturing was small, in absolute terms, the context of
the industry-the trends to vertical integration, the consequent fore-
closure from captive retail outlets, the specialization and lack of
flexibility of small manufacturers and the relative size of Brown
and Kinney in their respective markets-was such as to make the
loss of competition of unquestionable "quantitative substantiality."
Hence, the merger was contrary to the statute and, just as clearly,
contrary to the premises of anti-merger policy. 0
Contrary to the view of some critics, the Brown decision did not
imply a condemnation of the economies of integration. It held only
that a foreclosure from a substantial market as a consequence of
vertical acquisition serves to demonstrate illegality. Nor was the
opinion animated by a "protectionist" philosophy. The Court was pro-
tectionist only in the sense that it sought to safeguard, in full accord
with Congressional intent, the right of small manufacturers to com-
pete on substantially free and equal terms for an existing market.
While the Court seemed to frown on artificial foreclosure, it said
nothing to discourage low-cost producers from asserting their osten-
sible superiority in a competitive, non-captive market. Finally, the
Court-contrary to some critics-never came close to suggesting that
"almost any merger is subject to challenge."61 It merely found that,
in the context of the shoe industry, Brown's acquisition of Kinney,
despite the seemingly small percentages involved, constituted a fore-
closure of substantial proportions. And this finding, we submit, is in
full accord with an economic analysis of the shoe industry's anatomy
and physiology.
A final word about the "welfare" impact of the Supreme Court
decision. What, if anything, has the consumer lost as a result of
Brown's separation from Kinney? That Brown is large enough to
achieve all the economies of scale in shoe manufacturing is easily
60. The effect of the merger on the retail market may be dimissed; the case
turned on the exclusionary elements in the merger. In this connection, Kinney's
purpose in merging was said to be the impossibility of raising capital for expan-
sion by public offering without "seriously diluting the equity of the common
stockholder." Brief for Appellant, p. 101, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra
note 59.
The stockholders would not approve a dilution. Ergo, merger! One might well
ask why public policy should be governed by stockholders' unwillingness to ap-
prove sale of new stock at a fair value!
61. Business Week, Oct. 18, 1962, p. 58.
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demonstrable.6 2 The optimum shoe manufacturing establishment is
small. Advantages from vertical integration into retailing-alleged
by the Government to be of some importance in this industry-can
certainly be achieved without combination and without elimination
of Kinney as a market for independent manufacturers. Finally, no
one can justify mergers of the Brown-Kinney variety on the ground
that the market for shoes is so narrow that an enforced separation of
Brown and Kinney, and their operation as independent units, would
result in excess capacity.
The Government's brief did allege that dealers associated with
manufacturers secured "great competitive advantages in advertising,
insurance, discounts on purchases, and financial, architectural and
store site assistance. ' 63 And the Supreme Court opinion hazarded a
guess that some aspects of vertical integration (e.g., elimination of
wholesaling costs) 64 might prove beneficial to consumers. These mat-
ters, however, were never adumbrated with quantitative evidence. It
was never demonstrated, for example, that retail chains with 100 or
more stores-organizations which are playing an increasingly signif-
icant role in the shoe business--could not realize similar economies.
On the contrary, it would appear that Sears-Roebuck, Montgomery-
Ward, Edison Brothers, Kinney itself and thousands of independent
retailers, including discount shoe stores, have been able to establish
economical relations with manufacturers-without resort to integra-
tion by ownership or, for that matter, such alternative foreclosure
techniques as exclusive dealing or requirement contracts. Distribution
economies-in the shoe industry, at least-can be achieved without an
artificial lessening of competition.
Be that as it may, these considerations played an only subordinate
role in the decision. The Supreme Court placed primary stress, and
rightfully so, on the foreclosure of competition from a significant
market by means of combination. The presumption against such
means to achieve the demonstrated foreclosure was not overcome; and
it is difficult to see how-given the structural impact of the Brown-
Kinney merger on the shoe industry-any full-scale economic investi-
gation could ever have reversed the decision, even if the proceedings
had allowed for an extended inquiry into the future "vigor" or "work-
ability" of competition in the shoe industry. Could we have said with
any assurance that consumers would pay higher prices or that their
62. BAIN, BARREMS TO Naw C MPETITION 230 (1956); MACK, CONSUMPTION AND
BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS 18 (1956).
63. Brief for the United States, p. 134, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294 (1962).
64. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 63, at 344.
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style choices would be appreciably curtailed, because the Government
wanted to break asunder what Brown and Kinney had illegally joined
together? It seems improbable. It seems even more improbable that
the potential loss resulting from a divorcement order could possibly
outweigh the clear decline in competitive opportunities for indepen-
dent shoe manufacturers resulting from Brown's foreclosure of a
"quantitatively substantial" retail outlet.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/2
